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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE A 
WHETHER THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY THAT THE MANNER 
OF DEATH WAS "HOMICIDE" BY "DELIBERATE ACT" WAS AN IMPROPER 
COMMENT THAT USURPED THE JURY'S FUNCTION TO DETERMINE, 
INTENT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 704 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In general, a trial court is granted broad discretion in its decision lo admit 01 exclude 
evidence State\ Pena 86C>1' "M9P 'USi hlil'WJi loviici |iieslion ih\klli i Ih uiicct 
rule of evidence was selected, w hether a rule w as correctly applied, and whether a rule was correctly 
iiilnpieledarc In .il i|uestionsrequiringcorrectton-oi-enoi slandardof ieview Statev Horton. 848 
P.2d 708, 713 (Utah App 1993) 
ISSUE B 
WHETHER THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY THAT THE MANNER 
OF DEATH WAS "HOMICIDE" BY "DELIBERATE ACT" WAS IMPROPERLY 
BASED ON INADMISSTBLF HEARSAY EVIDENCE. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Same as Issue A above 
ISSUE I 
WHETHER THE TRIALCOURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW COUNSEL *OR DEFENDANI 
TO CROSS EXAMINE THE MEDICAL EXAMINER ABOUT WHETHER HIS OPINION 
THAT A "HOMICIDE" WAS COMMITTED BY "DELIBERATE \CT FVC I I DKD 
NEGLIGENT ACTS AND VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS IO CONFRONT 
WITNESSES AND PRESENT \ DEFENSF 
2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Although the trial court has discretion in limiting cross-examination, wide latitude is 
allowed for examining on matters affecting credibility; the appellate court will set aside a 
verdict if the erroneously excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence 
in bringing about a different verdict. State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 498,499-500 (Utah 1986). 
The violation of a defendant's constitutional right, such as refusal to allow cross-examination 
requires a reversal for new trial unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Chavez. 41 P.3d 1137 (Utah App. 2002). 
ISSUE D 
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESENT 
DURING THE RULING ON A QUESTION BY THE JURY DURING 
DELIBERATIONS WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE COURT ANSWERED A 
QUESTION BY THE JURY WITHOUT THE DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's application and interpretation of constitutional provisions is reviewed 
under a correction-of-error standard. State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464,465-66 (Utah 1991). 
The violation of a defendant's constitutional right requires reversal for a new trial unless the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Chavez. 41 P.3d 1137 (Utah App. 
2002). 
ISSUE E 
WHETHER IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE COURT TO GIVE INSTRUCTION 
NUMBER 19, WHICH ERRONEOUSLY STATES THE CffiCUMSTANCES UNDER 
WHICH A JURY MAY CONSIDER A LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE 
3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law is a conclusion of law reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Archuleta. 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993). 
ISSUE F 
WHETHER THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY ELICITED INADMISSIBLE 
EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE LACK OF BURN MARKS ON THE HANDS OF 
THE DECEASED 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Prosecutorial misconduct merits reversal when it calls to juror's attention matters they 
would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict and the appellate court believes 
that the jurors were probably influenced by the remarks. State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 
754 (Utah 1982). 
ISSUE G 
WHETHER "CURATIVE INSTRUCTIONS" GIVEN BY THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS 
ADEQUATE TO AMELIORATE THE CONTINUED PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The general rule regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence is that the trial 
court's decision will not be overturned in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Ostler v. 
Albina Transfer Co.. Inc.. 781 P.2d 445,447 (Utah App. 1989) citing Pearce v. Wistisen. 701 
P.2d489,491 (Utah 1985). 
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ISSUE H 
WHETHER THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT NEVER 
CHOKED THE VICTIM AND THAT APPELLANT AND VICTIM WERE NOT 
FIGHTING - CONTRARY TO THE PRESENTED EVIDENCE - IS GROUNDS FOR 
A NEW TRIAL 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court has discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a motion for a new 
trial, and we will not reverse a trial court's decision absent clear abuse of that discretion. State 
v. Wetzel. 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993); State v. Thomas. 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992). 
ISSUE I 
WHETHER THE EVDJENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a jury's verdict based on a claim of insufficient evidence, we owe "broad 
deference to the fact finder, [and our] power to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds 
of insufficient evidence is limited." State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1322 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and reverse only if that evidence is so 
"'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which [he] was convicted.'" IdL 
at 1322 (citation omitted). Further, in reviewing defendant's claim, we will not "weigh 
conflicting evidence, nor substitute [our] judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that 
of the jury." State v. Wright 893 P.2d 1113, 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Rather, "[i]n a jury 
5 
trial, 'the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight 
to be given particular evidence."' State v. Baker. 348 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 34 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (quoting State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)). 
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VI. 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW OF ISSUE NOT 
PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT 
All issues presented have been preserved in trial court or in subsequent motions with 
the trial court. 
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VII. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Amendment VI of the U.S. Constitution 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases 
the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury 
shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no even shall a jury 
consist of fewer than four person. In criminal cases the verdict shall be 
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury 
in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have 
been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, or a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exist unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
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or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704(b). 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition 
of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to 
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition 
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such 
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(m) 
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any 
point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of 
them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then 
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the 
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and 
the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 21(b). 
The verdict shall be unanimous. It shall be returned by the jury to the judge in 
open court and in the presence of the defendant and counsel. If the defendant 
voluntarily absents himself, the verdict may be received in his absence. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-17-13 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in 
a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held 
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party 
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as 
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the experts 
curriculum vitae, and one of the following: 
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or 
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony sufficient to give 
the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony; and 
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult with the 
opposing party on reasonable notice. 
(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any fee charged by 
9 
the expert for the consultation. 
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole or part on the 
results of any tests or other specialized data, the party intending to call the 
witness shall provide to the opposing party the information upon request. 
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or the information 
concerning the expert's proposed testimony, the party receiving notice shall 
provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates 
calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the information required 
under Subsection (l)(b). 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with the 
requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent 
substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing 
sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result of 
bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate 
sanctions. The remedy of exclusion of the expert's testimony will only apply if 
the court finds that a party deliberately violated the provisions of this section. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary 
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the 
expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by the 
expert at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary hearing 
shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae 
as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the expert may be 
called as an expert witness. 
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an employee of 
the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on 
reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert may be called as 
a witness at trial, and the witness is made available to cooperatively consult 
with the opposing party upon reasonable notice. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-32-2 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-35-17(m) 
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VIII. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Sheila McCleve presiding. 
The victim was shot on February 9, 2001. The Appellant was bound over on 
November 28, 2001 and a preliminary hearing was held at that time. He was arraigned on 
December 10, 2001, where he pled not guilty. A Motion to Quash bindover was held on 
January 18, 2002, which motion was denied. A pretrial conference was held on April 15, 
2002. The jury trial was held from April 23 to April 25, 2002. A sentencing hearing was 
held on June 17,2002 and continued to September 5,2002 and again to September 16,2002. 
A motion for a new trial was filed on September 26, 2002 and was denied on October 22, 
2002. The notice of appeal was filed on November 4,2002. 
The Appellant was ultimately convicted of Murder, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2001). 
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IX. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Between April 23 and April 25, 2002, a jury trial was held in the matter of the State 
of Utah versus Trent Ray Tucker("Tucker"), the Appellant. Tucker was charged with 
Criminal Homicide Murder - a First Degree Felony. TT p. 10. After the jury was seated, 
given instructions and recessed for lunch, counsel for the defendant, Ralph Dellpiana 
("Dellpiana") was given an opportunity to discuss defendant's Motion in Limine -
specifically, that Dr. Leis ("Leis"), medical examiner, be limited to testifying about the cause 
of death, but not the manner of death. TT p.22. The court ruled that Leis would be permitted 
to testify as to his opinion on the cause and manner of death based on "the reports of police 
officers and others as he compiles and examines the physical evidence and makes those 
observations." TT p.22. He added that Leis could testify based on "whatever the 
investigators said to him at the scene..." TT p.23. 
Dellpiana then mentioned that the defense had reached an agreement with the State, 
represented by Kelly R. Sheffield ("Sheffield") that the testimony of Nick Roberts 
("Roberts"), a "last-minute expert" TT p.25. ". .. would be limited to the description of the 
physical operation of the gun at issue." TT p.25. Dellpiana said that "[this type of gun as 
[sic] a single-action gun that requires two steps to fire. And I have agreed in advance that, 
so long as his testimony is just about that, that we won't object based on notice, the notice 
requirements, and would allow him to go ahead and testify on that subject." TT p.25. The 
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court asked Sheffield if he would limit his testimony simply to the operation of the gun, to 
which Sheffield replied "Correct." TT p.25. The court, to reaffirm, said, "And we're not 
going to go beyond that scope." Sheffield replied "Correct." TTp.26. Notwithstanding the 
agreement by the State, when Roberts was called to testify, and was asked, "If there were two 
people basically playing tug of war with the gun[,]" he responded, "If two people were 
playing tug of war with this gun that I checked, this gun would still have to have its trigger 
pulled to have been fired. And there would be burning of somebody. Somebody would be 
burned." TT p. 159. Dellpiana objected and requested that the comment about burning be 
stricken as being beyond the scope of the notice. While the jury was recessed, Dellpiana 
expressed concern at length to the court about the testimony being beyond the scope of the 
notice. TT pp. 166-170. The court agreed to strike the comment that someone would be 
burned. But Dellpiana rightly observed that by the court pointing out the objectionable 
statement, it "rings the bell again" in the minds of the jurors. TT p. 169. 
The State's first witness was Jeremy Ray Kettler ("Kettler"), a roommate of the 
Appellant and the victim, among others. TT p.36. Kettler stated that on February 9th there 
were approximately three visitors to the house. TT. p.41 whom Kettler later admitted were 
of the nature of thugs or gangsters. TT.p72. At one point, immediately after one of the 
visitors got done talking on the house telephone, he punched the wall and threw the phone. 
The visitor then began hitting one of the residents of the house named Ron. TT p.43. While 
the visitor was hitting and kicking Ron, the Appellant came into the room and pulled the 
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assailant off Ron. TT p.46. The assailant and another visitor named "Magic" turned on 
Appellant Tucker and began striking him. TT p.46. The fight then ended and two of the 
visitors left the house. TT p.45. 
Shortly after that fight, the visitor named "Magic" began arguing with Tucker. They 
then began fighting, and Kettler noticed a gun. TT p.49. It fell on the floor and Magic 
picked it up and hit Tucker "six or seven times with it." TT p.50. So Kettler kicked Magic 
and the gun came free. TT p.50. When Kettler picked up the gun he could not tell if it was 
cocked. TT p.52. After the altercation, and Magic had collected his things and stepped 
outside, Tucker asked Kettler for the gun. TT p.54. So Kettler gave it to him. TT p.55. 
Tucker left the room and, after a period of time passed, Kettler heard a loud noise. TT p.55. 
Kettler went to his dad's bedroom, tried to open the door, found resistance, and just pushed 
his way in. TTp.56. He found Tucker in the room and the victim lying still on the floor. TT 
p.56. 
Once Kettler got into the bedroom, he noticed blood coming from the victim's head. 
He asked Tucker "What'd you do?" Tucker responded by saying "I didn't mean to. She 
made me do it; I didn't mean to." TT p.60. Kettler then hit the wall and then hit Tucker in 
the face, TT p.61-62, knocking him out. Kettler left the room, had someone call an 
ambulance, and then went outside. TT p.63-64. Kettler saw Tucker one more time on the 
balcony and then didn't see him again that night. TT p.64. Kettler testified that during the 
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party, there was drinking going on. TT p.65. Sheffield then asked Kettler if there was any 
drug paraphernalia around the house, to which he replied there was not. TT p.66. 
After a short recess, Sheffield resumed questioning Kettler. He asked if Kettler saw 
anything in the victim's hand. Kettler said he saw a gun. TT. p.67. The handle was in her 
hand, the barrel was pointed to her feet, and her fingers were not on the trigger. TT p.68. 
Kettler's observation of the Appellant's demeanor was of someone "scared, frightened, 
discombobulated, disoriented." TT p.75. 
Kelly Kent ("Kent"), homicide detective with Salt Lake City Police, then testified. 
She was asked about her interview of Jeremy Kettler. Counsel for the Appellant then 
objected,". . .for the record, to the contents of her interview with Jeremy Kettler on hearsay 
grounds." TT p.80. It was during this objected to testimony that Kent stated Kettler told her 
he heard the Appellant and the victim arguing the morning of the shooting and he saw the 
Appellant's hands around the victim's neck. TT p.81. 
Sheffield again attempted to bring up the alleged presence of drug paraphernalia in 
the home by showing Kent photos. Dellpiana's objection was sustained. TT p.84. Sheffield 
continued trying to bring in the photos of drug paraphernalia, allegedly located at the home, 
but was denied permission by the court. TT pp.85-88. Sheffield, after numerous denials by 
the court, had the officer just testify that she saw drug paraphernalia in the home. TT p. 89. 
Sheffield examined Detective Kelly Kent about efforts to locate the Appellant, Tucker. 
He asked Kent details about locating the Appellant, including asking the question, "Do you 
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know how he was apprehended in Colorado?" TT p. 130. It was not until cross examination 
by Dellpiana that the jury would learn that Tucker was not, in fact, "apprehended" but rather 
gave himself up. TT p. 131. 
Dr. Edward M. Leis ("Leis") testified, describing his responsibilities as a medical 
examiner as investigating " . . . all deaths that are due to violence, deaths that are suspicious, 
deaths related to drugs, some deaths that occur in hospitals, and a few other types." TT 
p. 171. He is also required to, in homicide cases, collect evidence, document injuries, and 
testify in court. TT p. 171. Leis did not describe his duties as involving any type of 
psychological or psychiatric work, nor did his description of his training involve such. 
Dellpiana objected to Leis' being qualified to testify as to the manner, but not cause of death. 
His objection was overruled. TT p. 173. 
After describing the trajectory of the bullet into the head of the victim, Leis described 
two light red bands on the victim's neck which he interpreted as strangulation marks. TT 
p. 179. Leis also noted petechiae inside the eyelids and inside of her mouth, TT p. 181 and 
a small bruise to the inside of the right breast and on one shin. TT. p. 181-182. Counsel for 
Appellant later drew from Leis that he had previously testified in the Preliminary Hearing 
that Leis did not observe any ecchymosis, or bruising, in the neck, and that the petechiae he 
observed could conceivably have been caused by the gunshot wound. TT pp. 187-188 
Leis " . . . certified the immediate cause of death in this individual as a gunshot wound 
to the head." TT p. 184. He testified that he is required to not only certify the cause of death 
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but also " . . . a manner of death, which is a statistical classification." TT p. 184. Leis 
classified this as a homicide, which, for the medical examiner's office purposes, " . . . is 
defined as a deliberate act of one individual leading to the death of another individual." TT 
p. 184. 
During cross-examination, the following dialogue took place: 
Dellpiana : In regards to your testimony about the manner of death, I think you said 
that you classified the manner of death as a homicide. Right? 
Leis: That's correct. 
Q: One of the alternative choices is accident. Right? 
A: It can be, yes. 
Q: All right. Now, isn't it fair to say that for you to classify a gunshot wound as 
an accident requires, by your definition, that a gun be defective. Is that correct? 
A: It would have to be faulty in some capacity, yes. 
Q: All right. So in a situation where, for example, somebody was unaware of a 
gun being loaded and it was loaded and they pulled the trigger and it fired and it hit 
somebody off somewhere and they die, you would not classify that as an accident, would 
you? 
A: No. 
Q: Even though you would agree that the person wasn't intending, under those 
circumstances - -
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Sheffield: Objection, your Honor 
The Court: Sustain the objection. 
Dellpiana: Judge, I think it's important that the jury understand what is meant by 
"accident." 
The Court: Approach side bar. 
(a side-bar conference was held) 
Dellpiana: Just for the record, you - - well, never mind that. I think you already 
stated that adequately. 
Okay. So you've identified a cause of death and a manner of death. Let 
me ask you one more question about the manner of death. It's correct, is it not, you would 
agree that you don't use intent in making your determinations about manner of death? 
A: Correct. Intent is for the judge and the jury to decide in a particular case. 
Q: So you'd agree that a gunshot wound that you classified for your purposes as 
a homicide could be fired under extreme emotional distress? 
Sheffield: Objection, your Honor 
The Court: Sustained. 
Dellpiana: Judge, this is important that the jury understand that his - -
The Court: Approach the bench again. 
(A side-bar conference was held) 
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Dellpiana: You have testified, Dr. Leis, that you classified this as a deliberate 
homicide; is that correct? 
A: As a homicide. 
Q: Oh, okay. But because you don't use intent in making your determinations, 
you're not trying to speculate as to the state of mind of the person who may have been 
involved in firing that shot. Correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: A person, under what you're talking about when you call it a homicide, would 
not exclude somebody acting under extreme emotional stress. Correct? 
A: It wouldn't necessarily. 
Q. And because you're not using intent in making your determinations, it wouldn't 
specifically include somebody acting with criminal negligence. Correct? 
Sheffield: And I am going to object to that, your Honor. 
Dellpiana: Well -
Sheffield: The first question was fine. 
Dellpiana: I'm sorry for interrupting. Maybe we need to approach again. 
Sheffield: I think he has now moved from that first question we agreed to -
The Court: Come to side bar. 
(A side-bar conference was held.) 
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Dellpiana: One last question about this different question. In any case, Dr. Leis, 
your - the statements that you've made about the manner of death, based on your physical 
analysis and the conclusions that you've testified to, you would agree that the manner of 
death could be - in this case could have been caused under the circumstances that a judge 
and jury could find to be accidental. 
A: As I stated earlier, I mean I'm charged with classifying this death as to the 
manner of death, which I did as homicide. It's up to the legal system to define what level of 
charge, if any, should be leveled because of this particular act. I mean, I don't grade -1 don't 
put "Homicide, Grade 1" "Homicide, Grade 2." I call it "homicide," and then the legal 
system is charged with the duty of putting a degree or level to it. 
Q: Is that a yes? I mean, you'd acknowledge that, depending on the 
circumstances, that that would be a question for the judge and jury? 
Sheffield: Your Honor, he has asked his question and its been answered. 
The Court: Overruled. You can finish that. 
Dellpiana: I was finished. 
Q (by Dellpiana): I am saying for clarification - I'm only saying this because your 
answer went on for a little while. You would agree that it's up to the jury to decide a 
question such as that, such as whether a shooting was accidental or not. Did I understand 
your answer? 
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A: It would be up to a jury to decide whether they feel there was any intent and 
what degree of intent. 
Dellpiana: Thank you, Judge. That's all I have for Dr. Leis. TT pp. 189-193 
After Sheffield's redirect examination determined from Leis that CPR can also result 
in the Petechiae seen on the victim's body, he asked about abnormalities on the victim's 
fingers, hands or arm area and the exact proximity of the gun to her skin? An objection by 
Dellpiana was sustained on both questions as being beyond the scope. TT p. 195. 
Dellpiana's recross established that Leis did not know if CPR had been administered. TT 
pp. 195-196. 
After the jury recessed for lunch, the court explained to Dellpiana that the reasoning 
behind its continued refusal to allow Dellpiana to cross examine the medical examiner 
regarding his opinion about negligence on the part of Tucker, was that it was " . . . call[ing] 
for a legal conclusion on the doctor's behalf, having found that he could testify as to manner 
of death. TT p. 199 The court said, "But with respect to any kind of speculation or conclusion 
that was a legal one, I overruled your objection." TT p. 199. 
Dellpiana: Then I think there was a sustained objection to the criminal negligence. 
The Court: Right. 
Dellpiana: - concept 
The Court: On the theory that it was a legal conclusion that you were calling for. 
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Dellpiana: Which is, again, part of the grounds for why I was objecting to him 
making a conclusion that this was a deliberate homicide. TT p.200 
A motion was then made by Dellpiana to dismiss the case, which motion was denied 
by the court. TT pp.202-203. 
Dr. Robert K. Rothfeder ("Rothfeder") testified for the defense. After being qualified 
as a medical expert, he stated that the physical finding regarding the marks on the victims 
neck was rather minor, not specific to anything in particular and has no relationship at all to 
the victim's cause of death. TT pp.206-207. He said that the petechiae could have been 
caused by the gunshot wound, TT p.209, and that being struck in the head repeatedly could 
result in acute brain dysfunction. TT p.210. He also stated that "manner of death" is a legal 
concept containing five categories - suicide, accident, homicide, natural causes and 
undetermined. TT. p.212. Of those, he stated that natural causes was the only one that 
could be excluded as a manner of death, and that "undetermined" is the most proper 
determination. TTp.213. 
Tommy Ray Tucker, the Appellant's father, testified that when he came into the 
bedroom and saw the victim on the floor, he began pushing on the victim's solar plexus to 
keep her heart going. TT p.225. 
Tommy Tucker's testimony was followed by Appellant Trent Tucker's testimony. 
Tucker described the commotion involving the strangers in his house and the fight resulting 
in him getting hit in the face with the gun. TT p.233. He regained possession of the gun but 
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could not recall if he cocked the revolver at that time. TT p.235. He said he then went with 
the victim into the bedroom and asked her what the deal was with her friends. He said that 
if Magic, the assailant, was still out there, he was going to go take care of it. TT p.235. He 
said he then went for the door, the victim grabbed the gun saying "No!", and the gun went 
off. TTp.236 
Tucker testified about the fight he and the victim had earlier in the day and about the 
events immediately following the shooting. TT pp.237-239. He said he finally turned 
himself in because he had to resolve it. TT p.240. 
X. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A WHETHER THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY THAT THE 
MANNER OF DEATH WAS "HOMICIDE" BY "DELIBERATE ACT" 
WAS AN IMPROPER COMMENT THAT USURPED THE JURY'S 
FUNCTION TO DETERMINE, INTENT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 704 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
During the jury trial, the medical examiner was called by the State to testify. His role 
was ostensibly to explain to the jury his observations of the victim in his capacity as an expert 
medical examiner. He explained that the cause of death was as a result of a bullet penetrating 
the head of the victim. His testimony, however, exceeded his area of expertise when he made 
the legal conclusion that the victim's manner of death was homicide caused by a deliberate 
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act. The medical examiner was at no time qualified to testify as an expert as to the state of 
mind of the accused. His testimony prejudiced the jury and is reversible error. 
B. WHETHER THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY THAT THE 
MANNER OF DEATH WAS "HOMICIDE" BY "DELIBERATE ACT" 
WAS IMPROPERLY BASED ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that medical examiners may not rely on hearsay 
statements from other witnesses in determining manner of death; thus testimony that is based 
on such hearsay should be excluded. State v. Oniskor, 510 P.2d 929 (Utah 1973) (finding 
that it was error to allow State medical examiner to base his opinion about manner of death 
on hearsay information.) The medical examiner, called as an expert witness by the State to 
testify as to the cause of death, also testified as to the manner of death by utilizing 
information from reports and comments of police officers and the opinions of citizens, none 
of whom were witnesses of the actual shooting. The officers who provided the medical 
examiner input were either first responders or otherwise conveyed their opinions to the 
medical examiner at the beginning of the investigation. Allowance of the medical examiner's 
legal conclusion that the event was a deliberate act is a reversible error. 
C. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW COUNSEL FOR 
DEFENDANT TO CROSS EXAMINE THE MEDICAL EXAMINER ABOUT 
WHETHER HIS OPINION THAT A "HOMICIDE" WAS COMMITTED BY 
"DELIBERATE ACT" EXCLUDED NEGLIGENT ACTS AND VIOLATED 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND PRESENT A 
DEFENSE 
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Counsel for Appellant cross-examined the medical examiner, Dr. Leis after Leis had 
come to the legal conclusion the death was homicide (based on hearsay evidence). 
Appellant's only recourse to counter that harmful and improper testimony, was to rigorously 
cross-examine Leis as to why another conclusion - an accidental shooting - was not as 
feasible as his erroneous conclusion of homicide. Each attempt by counsel to mitigate and 
weaken Leis assertion was immediately disabled. The Constitutional right to confront this 
witness by conducting probing cross-examination was denied to the Appellant. 
D WHETHER THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE 
PRESENT DURING THE RULING ON A QUESTION BY THE JURY 
DURING DELIBERATIONS WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE COURT 
ANSWERED A QUESTION BY THE JURY WITHOUT THE 
DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE 
Relying on the Utah Constitution, statutes, and prior decisions, the Utah Supreme 
Court has ruled that "any communication between judge and jury should be in the presence 
of the accused, his [or her] counsel and the prosecutor." State v. Lee. 585 P.2d 58 (Utah 
1978). In the case at bar, Defendant was not present during the discussion regarding the jury 
question. Lee plainly prohibits the trial judge from communicating with the jury in this 
manner. 585 P.2d at 58. Thus, Defendant's constitutional right to due process was denied. 
Moreover, the discussion regarding the jury question was apparently not captured in the 
record of the trial. See TT at 307 (there is nothing in the record between the jury being given 
the case and the jury's verdict.). 
E WHETHER IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE COURT TO GIVE 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 19, WHICH ERRONEOUSLY STATES THE 
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CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A JURY MAY CONSIDER A 
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE 
In all criminal cases the defendant has a right to a unanimous verdict. Utah Const. 
Art. I section 10; Utah R. Crim. Pro. 21(b). In addition, a defendant has the right to present 
a defense, and to have the jury consider appropriate instructions on lesser-included offenses. 
State v. Piansiaksone. 954 P. 2d 861, 870 (Utah 1998). Instruction no. 19 improperly 
required the jury to "unanimously agree that the evidence has failed to establish any of the 
elements of Murder" before they could consider the lesser-included offense of Negligent 
Homicide. The incorrect instruction prohibited the jury from considering the lesser offense 
even if several of the jurors believed Murder had not been proven. Thus, Defendant's 
constitutional right to a fair jury trial and to present a defense were foreclosed by Instruction 
No. 19. 
F WHETHER THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY ELICITED 
INADMISSIBLE EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE LACK OF BURN 
MARKS ON THE HANDS OF THE DECEASED 
The State called a gun expert to testify without having given the required statutory 
notice. The witness was going to testify about how the suspect gun worked mechanically and 
how discharging gases may cause burn marks on the skin of anyone within a certain range 
of the gun itself. The defense theory was that the gun accidently fired when the victim was 
trying keep the Appellant from harming the gangsters in the other room. The prosecution, 
without providing the defense timely notice to prepare, had the gun expert testify that there 
were no bum marks on the hands or arms of the victim, hence she was not trying to pull the 
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gun away from the Ap? l^lant. Had Appellant been noticed within the statutory mandated 
time that this witness was going to testify, Appellant would have secured the services of an 
expert witness to counter that testimony and provide additional information to the jury to give 
the jury a balanced understanding of the facts. Instead, the Appellant was placed at a serious 
strategic disadvantage by the State. 
Appellant and the State came to an agreement, however, that Appellant would not 
continue the trial date not seek an expert in exchange for the State agreeing that the scope 
of their expert's testimony would be limited to the mechanical operation of the gun and 
nothing else. Notwithstanding the agreement, the prosecutor still elicited testimony outside 
the scope of the agreement. The witness then concluded his testimony by flagrantly violating 
the agreement. 
G WHETHER "CURATIVE INSTRUCTIONS" GIVEN BY THE TRIAL 
JUDGE WAS ADEQUATE TO AMELIORATE THE CONTINUED 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Subsequent to the testimony described in Issue F above, the court attempted to lessen 
the impact of the violative testimony by the gun expert by issuing an instruction to the jury 
to strike the expert's last comments. The jury, of course, had heard the damaging testimony, 
and no reason was given for the instruction or how the jury was expected to disregard the 
testimony. Because it was such damaging testimony, the instruction to strike the testimony 
was inadequate to mitigate its impact. Without testimony from an opposing expert, the jury 
was left to weigh that information as much as other, acceptable testimony. 
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H WHETHER THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE THAT 
APPELLANT NEVER CHOKED THE VICTIM AND THAT 
APPELLANT AND VICTIM WERE NOT FIGHTING - CONTRARY 
TO THE PRESENTED EVIDENCE - IS GROUNDS FOR A NEW 
TRIAL 
In the case at bar, Detective Kelly Kent gave objected-to hearsay testimony that 
Jeremy Kettler told him during an interview, that several hours before the victim's death, he 
saw Trent Tucker choking and arguing with the victim. This testimony was in sharp conflict 
with Defendant's testimony that on that morning he pushed the victim out of the bedroom 
he was then sharing with his girlfriend when she would not leave. He did not choke her and 
did not argue with her. Kettler, though a witness in the trial for Appellant, did not confirm 
said testimony. An affidavit provided by another a woman who was an eyewitness to the 
incident states that Appellant did not choke the victim and, rather, Appellant and the victim 
were drinking together, apparently happily. This new evidence not only contradicts 
Detective Kent's information, but alters significantly the dynamics of the prosecution's case. 
I WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
VERDICT 
Even without the defense presented by counsel for Appellant, the evidence provided 
to the jury was inadequate to convict Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. The following 
are the witnesses called by the prosecution, and a summary of the testimony that was most 
damaging to the Appellant: 
• Jeremy Ray Kettler: Kettler observed the assault on the Appellant by the 
gangster visitors preceding the shooting. He testified the gun was cocked when Appellant 
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had it, though he was not sure if he (Kettler) had cocked it. Kettler found the Appellant in 
the room with the victim and heard Appellant say "I didn't mean to. She made me do it; I 
didn't mean to." 
• Kelly Kent: Kent provided hearsay testimony about an alleged fight between 
Appellant and victim several hours before the shooting; discussed completely irrelevant but 
inflammatory information about drug paraphernalia begin in the house, and was prodded to 
testify that Appellant ultimately turned himself in. 
• Jason Snow: Took photos of the scene and talked about the gun he found. 
• Gary Trost: First officer at the scene. Provided no testimony of critical 
importance either way. 
• Karen Elliott: Fingerprint technician who was unable to detect any fingerprints 
on the gun. 
• Nicolas J. Roberts: Described the mechanics of the gun and gave improper 
testimony. 
• Dr. Edward A. Leis: Provided physiological information about the effect the 
bullet had on the victim and properly concluded and testified she died from the bullet wound. 
Testimony about the cause of marks on victim's neck was later contradicted by expert 
testimony and affidavit from an eyewitness. He also provided unsupported and improper 




A WHETHER THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY THAT THE 
MANNER OF DEATH WAS "HOMICIDE" BY "DELIBERATE ACT" 
WAS AN IMPROPER COMMENT THAT USURPED THE JURY'S 
FUNCTION TO DETERMINE, INTENT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 704 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The Utah Rules of Evidence prohibits expert witnesses from stating an opinion or 
even making an inference as to whether a defendant had a mental state constituting an 
element of the crime charged. Utah R. Evid. 704(b). 
Rule 704(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence specifically reads: 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition 
of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to 
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition 
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such 
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704(b) (Amended effective October 1, 1992). 
In the case at bar, however, Dr. Leis was allowed to testify that the manner of death 
was "homicide" and that it occurred by a "deliberate act." TT at 184. Lest the State assert 
that "deliberate" action does not imply "intentional" action as the element of intent is phrased 
in the murder statute at issue, the following definition of "deliberate" is provided. 
Deliberate, adj. Well advised; carefully considered; not sudden or rash; 
circumspect; slow in determining. Willful rather than merely intentional. 
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Formed, arrived at, or determined upon as a result of careful thought and 
weighing of considerations, as a deliberate judgment or plan. Carried on 
coolly and steadily, especially according to a preconceived design; given to 
weighing facts and arguments with a view to a choice or decision; careful in 
considering the consequences of a step; slow in action; unhurried; 
characterized by reflection; dispassionate; not rash. 
By the use of this word, in describing a crime, the idea is conveyed that the 
perpetrator weights the motives for the act and its consequences, the nature of 
the crime, or other things connected with his intentions, with a view to a 
decision thereon; that he carefully considers all these, and that the act is not 
suddenly committed. It implies that the perpetrator must be capable of the 
exercise of such mental powers as are called into use by deliberation and the 
and weighing of motives and consequences. 
BLACK'S DICTIONARY, p. 426 (6th ed. 1990)(internal citations omitted) 
"Although Rule 704 abolishes the per se rule against testimony regarding ultimate 
issues of fact, it does not allow all opinions. Nor is the rule intended to allow a witness to 
give legal conclusions." Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). And "[e]ven though testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to 
be decided by the trier of fact, it is clear that questions that would merely allow the witness 
to tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted, nor is the rule intended to allow a 
witness to give legal conclusions." State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996). Case law throughout the country delineates the propriety 
of expert testimony by psychiatrists and psychologists. 
There is authority.. . that it is beyond the competence of a psychiatric expert 
to express an opinion as to whether the defendant factually, at the time of the 
offense, acted with the requisite specific intent, the courts reasoning that such 
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an opinion is not based on the expert's scientific expertise and improperly 
invades the province of the jury. 
16 ALR 4th 666,670 Expert Testimony - Criminal Intent. 
Homicide cases wherein the expert psychiatric or psychological testimony relating to 
the defendant's capacity to entertain the requisite specific intent necessary for conviction was 
inadmissible for the purpose of showing that the defendant was incapable of acting, or did 
not act, with the requisite specific intent include examples such as Dawson v. State. 439 P.2d 
472 (Nev. 1968) (The determination of the degree of a crime, based on the state of mind of 
the accused, was within the province of the jury. The expert was not capable of giving the 
jury any information they did not possess from facts in evidence.), and Steele v. State. 294 
NW2d 2 (Wis. 1980) (Proffered testimony of a psychiatrist, a psychiatric social worker, and 
a psychologist that the defendant lacked a capacity to form an intent to kill was properly 
excluded by the trial court), and State v. Donahue. 109 A.2d 364 (Conn. 1954) cert, denied 
and app. dismissed 349 U.S. 926,99 L.Ed. 1257,75 S.Ct. 775 (questions of factual intent of 
the defendant to kill his victim were outside the scope of expert testimony). See also State 
v. Narten. 407 P.2d 81 (Ariz. 1965) cert, denied 384 U.S. 1008, 16 L.Ed. 2d 1021, 86 S.Ct 
1985, Ezzell v. State. 88 So.2d 280 (1956 Fla.), People v. Jenko. 102 NE2d 783 (111. 1951), 
State v.Fov. 582 P.2d 281, later app. 607 P.2d 481 (Kan. 1978), State v. Marshall. 282 SE2d 
422 (NC 1981), State v. Heard. 184 NW2d 156 (Wis. 1971), State v. Smith. 564 P.2d 1194 
(Wyo. 1977). 
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Leis was qualified by the court only to testify as an expert medical examiner. At no 
time was there a suggestion by prosecutors he would testify in any other capacity, much less 
as a psychiatric expert qualified to divine intent on the part of the defendant. Further, when 
Leis testified, no foundation was laid for him to speak as a psychiatric or psychological 
expert. Yet by not just classifying the victim's death as a homicide out of some bureaucratic 
necessity, but following that up with testimony that the victim could have died no other way 
except by Appellant's intentional desire for her death extinguished any necessity for the jury 
other than to rubber stamp his decision. 
Dr. Leis' opinion usurped the function of the jury,. Such testimony has been found 
to be reversible error. State v. VaiL 51 P.3d 1285 (Utah 2001) (jury verdict reversed where 
the prosecutor elicited improper testimony from an expert concerning the truthfulness of a 
sexual assault victim). Such testimony is particularly prejudicial where an expert is testifying 
because of the tendency of jurors to simply adopt the judge of experts. See State v. 
Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1989). 
B WHETHER THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY THAT THE 
MANNER OF DEATH WAS "HOMICIDE" BY "DELIBERATE ACT" 
WAS IMPROPERLY BASED ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that medical examiners may not rely on hearsay 
statements from other witnesses in determining manner of death; thus testimony that is based 
on such hearsay should be excluded. State v. Oniskon 510 P.2d 929 (Utah 1973) (finding 
that it was error to allow State medical examiner to base his opinion about manner of death 
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on hearsay information.) In Oniskor, the defendant was convicted for rape, murder and 
robbery. The trial court admitted, over defendant's objection, the State medical examiner's 
opinion that cause of death was manual suffocation. Id at 931-32. The defense objected on 
the grounds that the medical examiner's opinion was admittedly based on a hearsay statement 
from a police officer that the defendant had confessed to suffocating the victim with a pillow. 
Id. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court found the trial court's ruling to be in error because 
the medical examiner's opinion was based on hearsay. Id at 932. The court cited as 
precedent State v. Hadlev. 65 Utah 109,234 P.2d 940 (1925) and quoted: 
So that while we have seen, the opinion of experts may in some cases 
be based upon personal knowledge gained from their own observation or 
examination, they cannot give in evidence opinions based upon information 
gained from the statements of others outside the courtroom, since in such case 
the opinions would depend upon hearsay. 
Oniksor, 510 P.2d at 932, quoting Hadley. 65 Utah at 116 (emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, Dr. Leis admitted that his opinion the decedent was shot by another 
person was based, in part, on statements by others: 
By Mr. Dellapiana: 
Q: Doctor, isn't it true that in doing your examination, as part of your 
opinion as to the manner of death, are based in part on a history, any 
history that you can get from witnesses? 
A: Uhm, well before I start the examination I have an investigative report which 
is prepared by one of the investigators in our office to review. I had also gone 
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to the scene of the death the day before and had some discussions with 
homicide investigators at the scene. Detective Kellie Kent was also at the 
autopsy and brought in some additional verbal information when she was 
there. 
Q: All right. And just for purposes of this voir dire, your honor, is it correct of me 
to say that in that, either in that investigative report, in your discussions with 
homicide investigators, and/or with Kellie Kent, that you were advised that 
there was a male, adult suspect believed to be involved in the shooting? 
A: Yes 
Mr. Dellpiana: 
All right. And so while, I don't' think there's any doubt or any reason to 
question your opinion as to cause of death being a gunshot wound, judge, to 
the extent that the opinion is based on, as we now know from hearsay sources 
as to the cause of death being a third person, I would object on hearsay 
grounds to that portion of the opinion being entered as evidence at this time. 
The Court: 
Doctor, maybe you could just state for the record what the basis of your 
opinion that it was a third party actor that caused the shooting or that fired the 
gun. What is the basis of your opinion in that regard? 
The Witness: 
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It's based not only on investigative information but also the physical 
findings of the body. Although, the gunshot wound is a close contact, meaning 
the gun was pressed right up against the face when it was fired, you know, it 
comes down to one other person, or was this a self-inflicted injury. 
Number one, with the number of gunshot wound cases that I have been 
involved with, and suicides, for women to commit suicide with handguns is 
rare. They usually do other means, more commonly, drug overdose. That's 
not to say we do not see deaths with gunshot wounds. 
If women tend to shoot themselves to commit suicide, more commonly 
the entrance wounds are located on the chest. And that's most common. 
The next most common location is on the head. And if gunshot wounds 
occur to the head they are usually to the temple areas or the weapon is placed 
in the mouth. It's extremely rare that a weapon is placed up against the eye 
and discharged as a means to commit suicide. So I find that strongly in favor 
of the fact this is not a suicidal act. 
Plus, given the additional information that there were comments made, 
there was an argument heard between another individual and the victim prior 
to the gunshot being heard, and that she had sustained other injuries, to me, 
indicates that a homicidal act took place and not a suicide. 
The Court: 
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Is it common for forensic examiners to rely upon those investigative sources 
in formulating their opinion? 
The Witness: 
We have to because the autopsy by itself, just simply the examination of the 
body, does not always tell you everything that happened. 
The Court: 
All right. I'm going to find that there is an adequate foundation for the entire 
opinion so the entire opinion will be admitted in evidence for purposes of 
preliminary hearings. 
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, pp. 29-32 (emphasis added) 
The testimony the jury heard from this expert was the legal conclusion that the manner 
of death of the victim was by "homicide." The foundation of the admission, in the trial, of 
the medical examiner's expert opinion (based on hearsay evidence) was, of course, laid in 
the preliminary hearing. The pertinent preliminary hearing transcript of the expert's voir dire 
is copied above. A close analysis of that dialogue between counsel, the witness and the court 
will reveal that only two factors were discussed - first, that based on the medical examiner's 
personal, first person, expert observations, suicide was not involved. And second, based 
solely on second-hand information (see emphasized portions of the transcript above), the 
medical examiner concluded that a homicide was committed. Independent of those baseless, 
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outside opinions that a homicide took place, the only legal conclusion the medical examiner 
should have articulated was that the manner of death was unknown. 
C. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW COUNSEL FOR 
DEFENDANT TO CROSS EXAMINE THE MEDICAL EXAMINER ABOUT 
WHETHER HIS OPINION THAT A "HOMICIDE" WAS COMMITTED BY 
"DELIBERATE ACT" EXCLUDED NEGLIGENT ACTS AND VIOLATED 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND PRESENT A 
DEFENSE 
Defendants have a constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses 
against them. U.S. Const. Amend. VI. Normally, the right to confront one's accusers is 
satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses. Pennsylvania 
v. Ritchie, 107 S.Ct 989, 480 U.S. 39, 94 L.Ed.2d 40. In the case at bar, counsel for 
Defendant was denied not only wide latitude, but not allowed any latitude in cross-examining 
Dr. Leis about whether his opinion excluded the possibility of a negligent act. TT at 191, 
199. 
The following cross-examination took place between counsel for Appellant, Mr. 
Dellpiana and the medical examiner, Dr. Leis, with objections by Mr. Sheffield representing 
the State, and sustained by the court. 
Q: All right. So in a situation where, for example, somebody was unaware 
of a gun being loaded and it was loaded and they pulled the trigger and it fired 
and it hit somebody off somewhere and they die, you would not classify that 
as an accident, would you? 
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A: No. 
Q: Even though you would agree that the person wasn't intending, under 
those circumstances - -
Sheffield: Objection, your Honor 
The Court: Sustain the objection. 
Dellpiana: Just for the record, you - - well, never mind that. I think you 
already stated that adequately. 
Okay. So you've identified a cause of death and a manner of death. Let me 
ask you one more question about the manner of death. It's correct, is it not, 
you would agree that you don't use intent in making your determinations about 
manner of death? 
A: Correct. Intent is for the judge and the jury to decide in a particular 
case. 
Q: So you'd agree that a gunshot wound that you classified for your 
purposes as a homicide could be fired under extreme emotional distress? 
Sheffield: Objection, your Honor 
The Court: Sustained. 
39 
Q. And because you're not using intent in making your determinations, it 
wouldn't specifically include somebody acting with criminal negligence. 
Correct? 
Sheffield: And I am going to object to that, your Honor. 
Dellpiana: Well -
Sheffield: The first question was fine. 
Dellpiana: I'm sorry for interrupting. Maybe we need to approach again. 
Sheffield: I think he has now moved from that first question we agreed to. 
The Appellant's entire defense rested on the theory that the bullet that killed the 
victim was accidently fired by gun as the victim was trying to keep the Appellant from 
returning to the room where he was previously fighting with gangster-type visitors. Counsel 
for the Appellant, however, was not permitted to ask the medical examiner anything that 
suggested that the accident-theory carried as much weight as the medical examiner's legal 
conclusion of "homicide." 
This error was particularly prejudicial because, as noted previously, Dr. Leis was 
allowed to opine that death was caused by a "deliberate" act by Mr. Tucker. Being unable 
to cross-examine on this point precluded the defense from mitigating the prejudice inherent 
in Dr. Leis' testimony. Thus, Defendant's constitutional right was denied and prejudice 
ensued. A constitutional right should be deemed to be an "impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect" on Mr. Tucker's right to a fair trial. Utah R.Crim.Proc. 24(a). 
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Moreover, violation of a Defendant's constitutional right requires reversal for a new trial 
unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Chavez, 41 P.3d 1137 
(Utah App. 2002). (reversing a jury verdict where the defendant was not allowed to full 
cross-examine a key prosecution witness on bias issues). 
D WHETHER THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE 
PRESENT DURING THE RULING ON A QUESTION BY THE JURY 
DURING DELIBERATIONS WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE COURT 
ANSWERED A QUESTION BY THE JURY WITHOUT THE 
DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution establishes a right for criminal 
defendants "to appear and defend in person." This right extends to the trial judge's 
consideration of jury questions sent to the judge during deliberations. State v. Lee. 585 P.2d 
58 (Utah 1978). Relying on the Utah Constitution, statutes, and prior decisions, the Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled that "any communication between judge and jury should be in the 
presence of the accused, his [or her] counsel and the prosecutor." Id. 
Although the statute at issue in Lee was amended and then codified in the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, the present rule is similar, and no case law has ever eliminated a 
defendant's constitutional right to appear in court during judge and jury communications. 
Following Lee, the legislature amended the statute addressing jury questions sent to judges 
during deliberations. The former statute had required the trial judge to bring the jury into the 
courtroom and address the question "in the presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting 
attorney and the defendant or his counsel." Utah Code Ann. Section 77-32-2 (1976). 
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Two years after Lee was decided, the legislature amended the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and altered the statute addressing jury questions: 
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall 
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate 
such request to the court. The court may then direct that the jury 
be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel the court shall respond to the 
inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be 
given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its 
discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having the 
jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the 
response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
Utah Code Arm. Section 77-35-17(m)( 1982) (emphasis added). In 1989 the legislature 
repealed the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Utah Supreme Court adopted them as court 
rules. Utah Code Ann. Chapter 77-35 (Supp. 1990). The Supreme Court designated the 
statute quoted above as Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(m). 
In the case at bar, Defendant was not present during the discussion regarding the jury 
question. Lee plainly prohibits the trial judge from communicating with the jury in this 
manner. 585 P.2d at 58. Thus, Defendant's constitutional right to due process was denied. 
Moreover, the discussion regarding the jury question was apparently not captured in the 
record of the trial. See TT at 307 (there is nothing in the record between the jury being given 
the case and the jury's verdict.). 
E WHETHER IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE COURT TO GIVE 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 19, WHICH ERRONEOUSLY STATES THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A JURY MAY CONSIDER A 
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE 
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In all criminal cases the defendant has a right to a unanimous verdict. Utah Const. 
Art. I section 10; Utah R. Crim. Pro. 21(b). In addition, a defendant has the right to present 
a defense, and to have the jury consider appropriate instructions on lesser-included offenses. 
State v. Piansiaksone. 954 P. 2d 861, 870 (Utah 1998). An instruction about the order of 
deliberations when considering whether the charged offense or a lesser offense applies must 
not impede a jury's opportunity to consider the defendant's lesser included offenses. Id. At 
870 
In Piansiaksone. a murder case, the trial court instructed the jury that "Before you can 
convict of manslaughter you must have found that the evidence fails to establish one or more 
of the elements of murder" beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 870. The trial court found that 
the instruction was improper because they did not allow the jury to consider the lesser 
included offense of manslaughter. Id The right to lesser-included offense instructions "is 
more than just a procedural nicety; it is rooted in [a] defendant's constitutional right to a jury 
trial." State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254,266 (Utah 1998). The court believed that "[Jjurors 
should not be precluded from determining how criminal conduct should be characterized and 
judged." Id at 267. 
Instruction no. 19 in the case at bar is similar to that in Piansiaksone because it 
improperly intrudes on the jury's opportunity to consider a lesser-included offense. 
Instruction no. 19 improperly required the jury to "unanimously agree that the evidence has 
failed to establish any of the elements of Murder" before they could consider the lesser-
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included offense of Negligent Homicide. See Addendum A. A proper instruction would 
have directed the jurors that they could consider the lesser-included offense if they did not 
unanimously agree that all the elements of murder were met. Thus, the proper instruction 
would have allowed the jury to consider the lesser offense even if only one of the jurors did 
not find the offense of Murder proved. The incorrect instruction prohibited the jury to 
consider the lesser offense even if seven of the jurors believed Murder had not been proven. 
Thus, Defendant's constitutional right to a fair jury trial and to present a defense were 
foreclosed by Instruction No. 19. The violation of a Defendant's constitutional right requires 
reversal for a new trial unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Chavez 41 P.3d 1137 (Utah App. 2002). Appellant in the case at bar moved for a new trial 
on the basis that, among other things, Instruction number 19 was erroneous. Appellant's 
motion was denied. 
F WHETHER THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY ELICITED 
INADMISSIBLE EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE LACK OF BURN 
MARKS ON THE HANDS OF THE DECEASED 
Nicolas Roberts was an expert witness called by the State without having given the 
required statutory notice. See Utah Code Ann. Section 77-17-13 (requiring 30 days notice 
of an expert's testimony); State v. Tolano. 29 P.3d 1 (Utah 2001) (reversing jury verdict for 
violation of Rule 77-17-13). Mr. Roberts was called by the State purportedly to testify as a 
gun expert. Roberts was thus a "surprise" witness creating an unfair advantage for the 
prosecution. 
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Counsel for the defense, Dellpiana, discussed the matter with counsel for the State, 
Sheffield, and negotiated a compromise by which Dellpiana would not ask for a continuance, 
and, in exchange, Sheffield would agree to limit the witness's testimony to a description of 
the physical mechanism of a single-action revolver. See 150-51 158 (discussing stipulation). 
Mr. Roberts did testify about the mechanism of a single action revolver (i.e.., that the 
hammer must be pulled back before it can be fired). See Trial Transcript (TT) at 148-49. 
But later, Roberts also began talking about a test he conducted on a revolver similar to the 
gun in evidence in the case at bar, concerning its "flash" pattern. TT at 150. Counsel for the 
defense objected that the test result was beyond the agreed scope of the witness's testimony. 
TT at 150-159. Prior to trial counsel for the defense agreed that Mr. Roberts could testify 
about the fact that the gun at issue in the case at bar is a single-action revolver that has to be 
cocked to be fired. TT at 168. In addition, counsel for the State specifically proffered to 
counsel for the defense a proposed exhibit showing a "flash test" that is, a document 
exhibiting the pattern that would be made by a similar gun when it was fired. This flash test 
was specifically described as being beyond the scope of the agreed testimony, given the lack 
of expert testimony. TT at 168-69. The court agreed that the testimony was inadmissible and 
sustained the defense's objection to the testimony. TT at 151, 168. 
Counsel for the State nevertheless intentionally elicited this excluded testimony at 
trial. Specifically, the State elicited evidence that because of the characteristics of the 
weapon's flash pattern, someone holding the weapon by some means other than by the handle 
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(such as during a "tug-of-war" over the weapon) "would be burned." TT at 159. The State 
disingenuously attempted to describe the testimony as being part of the "physics" of the gun's 
operation that could be described as falling under the "mechanics" of the gun's operation. 
TTatl68. 
The argument was disingenuous because prior to trial both counsel sat in the 
conference and discussed the admissibility of the flash test. The following is an excerpt from 
the trial: 
Prior to trial we sat back in the conference room and Kelly [one of the 
prosecutors] showed me this flash test. And I said, "What's that?" He says, 
"Well, Nick Roberts did a flash test with the gun and we want to show that as 
part of the evidence." And I'm saying [to Kelly], "that's way beyond what I 
understood our agreement to be about how you shoot a single-action revolver." 
"And for them to come in and say that they thought that was going to 
be okay isn't correct." 
TT at 168-69. In addition, an objection by the defense to a discussion about the 
"flash" had already been sustained. TT at 151. 
The test about whether prosecutorial misconduct is prejudicial is whether the 
prosecutor "call[ed] to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified 
in considering in determining their verdict, and were they, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, probably influenced by those remarks." State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483,486-87 
(Utah 1984) (reversing a jury verdict where the prosecutor remarked about matters outside 
the evidence and there was not compelling proof of defendant's guilt). 
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The State's actions constitute misconduct because the prosecutor knew that the 
evidence about the "flash test was beyond the scope of the agreement with counsel for the 
defense. TT at 151, 168-69. The court so found as well by sustaining a defense objection 
about the "flash", TT at 151, and about someone being burned by the flash. TT at 169. 
Furthermore, the State's intentional misconduct was prejudicial because the jury 
considered the evidence concerning the lack of bums on the hands of the victim. See 
Affidavit of Tawni Hanseen, Addendum B (indicating that the jury talked about how there 
should have been bum marks on the hands of the victim if she were pulling on the gun, and 
there were not). Moreover, the remarks by the gun expert can. also be seen to be prejudicial 
because they are not merely extraneous or irrelevant, but because they go directly to the 
primary defense that the shooting was accidental. The defense claimed the victim pulled on 
the barrel of the gun to try to try take it from Mr. Tucker so that he would not go after her 
friends who had just been assaulted by beating him on the head and face with the butt of the 
gun. TT at 289-90. Given the lack of compelling direct evidence of guilt, it is easy to see 
how the jury was "probably influenced by those remarks." Troy 688 P.2d at 486-87. 
Accordingly, the State's misconduct should be found to be an "impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect" on Mr. Tucker's right to a fair trial. Utah R. Crim. Pro. 24(a). 
G WHETHER "CURATIVE INSTRUCTIONS" GIVEN BY THE TRIAL 
JUDGE WAS ADEQUATE TO AMELIORATE THE CONTINUED 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
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Though the trial court admonished the jury to disregard the mention of lack of burn 
marks on the victim, the devastation wrought by that statement was far too damaging to be 
ameliorated by a simple instruction to disregard it. TT p. 170. The statement about the lack 
of burn marks by the gun expert about flash coming out the front and the side of the gun, TT 
p. 150-151, gases going out of the gun, TT p. 156-157, and finally, that "there would be 
burning of somebody. Somebody would be burned" TT p. 159 resounded in the juror's 
minds. This was no ordinary testimony - it was an expert witness telling the jury that the 
Appellant was guilty since an accident, as a matter of scientific certainty could not have 
occurred. No curative admonition or instruction could diminish the impact of that testimony. 
Whether intentional or not, the prosecution elicited testimony from its expert witness that 
was contrary to the proffers made prior to trial and even during the trial; and, despite the 
efforts of the court to cure the effect of the elicited testimony, the damage was done, and 
seeds of prejudice against the Appellant were planted in the minds of the jury. 
While the court often stressed to the jury the importance of keeping an open mind and 
to listen to all the evidence before arriving at a conclusion about the case, it failed to 
specifically address the nature of curative instructions at any time during its proceedings in 
advance of the instruction actually given in response to the Appellant's objection. TT. p. 170. 
This omission prevented the jury from being forewarned both before and after his testimony 
to disregard the prejudicial comments of the gun expert.1 Therefore, the court's statement 
1
 See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262.273. n.8. In that case, the trial court gave not only 
a strong curative admonition but also a preliminary instruction at the beginning of trial warning 
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"Just before the recess the Court took under advisement a response by Deputy 
Roberts. And the portion about that response that was volunteered that 
indicated somebody would have been burned will be stricken from the record 
and the jury will disregard that portion. I believe it was something to the effect 
that somebody would be burned." 
The statement was inadequate at considering the magnitude of the damage done. 
In State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998), this Court acknowledged that 
curative instructions are not necessarily a '^cure-all" and that some errors may be too 
prejudicial for curative instructions to mitigate their effect, and a new trial may be the only 
proper remedy. See also, State v. Wetzel 868 P.2d at 69 (Utah 1993) ("[C]urative 
instructions are not always sufficient to avoid the potential prejudice to the Appellant."; see 
also. State v. Auble. 754 P.2d 935,937 (Utahl 988) (stating that limiting instructions may not 
be sufficiently effective to prevent jury from considering evidence which is unfairly 
prejudicial to Appellant). It should be noted that the curative instruction given in Harmon 
was much more complete, forceful and instructive than any given in the instant case; 
furthermore, in Harmon the court asked the jury members if they had any questions, which 
was not done in the instant case. Cf. R. 331 and 956 P.2d at 270-271. 
jurors that testimony or exhibits would be offered which would be deemed inadmissable, and 
that the jury should treat such matters as if they had never heard them. 
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Additionally, in Harmon. Justice Durham provided an opinion2 as to the efficacy of 
curative jury instructions. She set forth some of the ideas of J. Alexander Tanford from his 
article entitled "The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions," 69 Neb.L.Rev.71 (1990) 
(containing extensive discussion of empirical research and proposing solutions to the 
problem of ineffective curative instructions). Professor Tanford suggests, among other 
things, that. . . (2) trial judges instruct jurors at the beginning of trial that they will be 
required to disregard evidence which is successfully objected to and that any reference to an 
Appellant's criminal record may not be considered as evidence of guilt (this because 
psychological research demonstrates that forewarning about prejudicial information can 
reduce susceptibility to it). While Professor Tanford's suggestions are not controlling, a 
simple understanding of human nature compels reasonable minds to entertain the notion that 
curative instructions are more often than not ineffective, especially where, as in the instant 
case, the improper testimony is so authoritative, relevant and devastating to the defendant's 
case. 
This Court further stated in Harmon that it must use the standard set forth in Greer v. 
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 n.8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109 n.8, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987), to review 
curative instructions on appeal to ensure that the Appellant received a fair trial. 956 P.2d at 
2
 It should be noted that Harmon appears to be a plurality opinion - Russon, J., wrote the 
principal opinion in which only Howe, J., fully concurred (only two of the five justices). 
Stewart, j . , concurred in the result without comment. Durham, however, who also concurred in 
the result, wrote a separate opinion in which Zimmerman, J., concurred. Thus, as many justices 
concurred with Durham's separate opinion as with Russon's opinion. 
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273. See also, United States v. Humphrey, 34 F.3d 551, 556-7 (7th Cir. 1994) (cited in 
Harmon at 272.) In Greer the United States Supreme Court stated, "[W]e normally presume 
that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently 
presented to it, unless there is an 'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be unable to 
follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would 
be 'devastating' to the Appellant." 
The standard in Greer involves two prongs - that of 'overwhelming probability' that 
the jury will be unable to abide by the court's instructions and that the evidence supposedly 
cured by an instruction is 'devastating.' In the instant case, despite the efforts of the 
Appellant prior to trial to prevent the adverse testimony from coming out, the very testimony 
the Appellant sought to preclude did come out: and, although the court sought to mitigate the 
effect of that testimony by means of curative instructions, the instructions failed to cure the 
devastating effect of the testimony. 
To put the testimony in perspective, here you have a very authoritative and 
experienced expert witness on the stand, who testifies about the mechanics of the gun used 
in the shooting, and then goes on to blurt out that "if two people were playing tug-of-war 
with this gun that I checked, this gun would still have to have its trigger pulled to have been 
fired. And there would be a burning of somebody. Somebody would be burned." TT p. 159. 
The jury could not ignore the weight of such testimony, even when instructed by the court 
to disregard it. So the prejudicial testimony elicited by the prosecution at once devastated 
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the defense's strategy and pushed the jury toward a verdict that resulted in Appellant's 
incarceration. 
Furthering the argument of the questionable efficacy of curative instructions, in State 
v. WetzeL 868 P.2d 64, 69 (Utah 1993), this court held that in relation to curative 
instructions and their efficacy, "The potential for prejudice is greatest when the 
circumstantial facts are closely related to the issue the jury must ultimately decide. When, 
as here, the improper purpose for which the jury might consider the evidence bears closely 
on the central question - Appellant's guilt or innocence - the utility of curative instructions 
becomes doubtful." (Where victim's state of mind was not in issue, but Appellant's state of 
mind could have been, per the curative instruction, the utility of the curative instruction was 
deemed doubtful). 
The State could perhaps respond with the cynical argument that under Rule 16(g) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the court learns a party has failed to comply with 
discovery rules, the court may order a continuance to alleviate the problem. Of course when 
the Appellant and Appellee agreed before trial that Appellant would not seek a continuance 
if Appellee would avoid discussing certain issues, Appellant assumed the Appellee would 
comport itself according to the agreement. If any time was the best time to request a 
continuance in this trial, it was prior to arguing the case before the jury. Once testimony 
began, however, Appellee decided to flagrantly violate the agreement, and a continuance 
would only delay the inevitable. A continuance would, in fact, have only highlighted to an 
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even greater degree the violative testimony of the gun expert. Counsel for Appellant faced 
a conundrum created by the State. 
H WHETHER THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE THAT 
APPELLANT NEVER CHOKED THE VICTIM AND THAT 
APPELLANT AND VICTIM WERE NOT FIGHTING - CONTRARY 
TO THE PRESENTED EVIDENCE - IS GROUNDS FOR A NEW 
TRIAL 
It is a long-established rule that new evidence calling a verdict into question can be 
grounds for a new trial. State v. Halford. 17 Utah 475, 54 P. 819 (1898) (holding that 
defendant convicted of rape was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence and affidavits from which it appeared that defendant was surprised at testimony of 
the prosecutrix and that much of material testimony given by her at trial was untrue); State 
v. Campbell 25 Utah 342,17 P. 529 (1903) (new trial granted where testimony of defendant 
convicted of manslaughter was in sharp conflict with testimony of other primary witness and 
new affidavits strongly tended to corroborate defendant). 
In the case at bar, Detective Kelly Kent gave objected-to hearsay testimony about 
Jeremy Kettler, telling him during an interview that in the morning, several hours before the 
victim's death, he saw Trent Tucker choking and arguing with the victim. This testimony 
was in sharp conflict with Defendant's testimony that on that morning he pushed the victim 
out of the bedroom he was then sharing with his girlfriend when she would not leave, but that 
he did not choke her and did not argue with her. 
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New evidence from Barbara Penman indicates that this testimony about an argument 
was erroneous See Affidavit of Barbara Penman, Addendum C. Ms. Penman indicates in 
her affidavit that the victim told her that Mr. Tucker did not choke her. She also states that 
the day the victim died, she saw the victim and she had no marks on her neck at that time and 
that she and Mr. Tucker were drinking together, apparently happily. 
Given the lack of competent evidence that Defendant was guilty of murder, this 
important new information should be found to be grounds for a new trial. 
I. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
VERDICT 
The evidence as presented by the Plaintiff/Appellee to support their allegations was 
inadequate to sustain the verdict. Jeremy Kettler's testimony described a party in which 
Appellant Tucker was assaulted by several gang-type individuals. He obtained a pistol to 
defend himself and his home, but was beat about the face by a "guest" using the pistol. 
Tucker, who by now was dazed from being beat about the head, had every reason to use the 
weapon on the "guests" but absolutely none to use it on the victim. Kettler testified the gun 
may have been cocked when he had it and it was taken by Appellant. TT p.52. When Kettler 
heard the gunshot and found Appellant with the victim, he heard the Appellant blurt out: "I 
didn't mean to. She made me do it; I didn't mean to." TT p.60. To Kettler, the Appellant 
looked "scared, frightened, discombobulated, disoriented." TT p.75. Said statements and 
demeanor are those of any person who would have experienced the trauma of such an 
episode. 
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Detective Kelly Kent then provided objected-to hearsay testimony for the prosecution 
about an argument she said Jeremy Kettler told her about between the appellant and the 
victim - an argument Kettler himself did not describe during his testimony. Newly 
discovered evidence, in fact flatly contradicts the Kent testimony. Barbara Penman, in fact, 
signed and swore in an affidavit that her recollection of the morning of the shooting was that 
the Appellant and the victim did not argue. Kent also mentioned drug paraphernalia at the 
scene. TT p.83. Kent also described how the Appellant was "apprehended" in Colorado TT 
p. 130, although it was later established that the Appellant actually turned himself in. TT 
p. 131. Kent's testimony does not provide evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Appellant murdered the victim. 
Detective Jason Snow testified about photographs he took while processing the scene 
of the accidental shooting, TT pp.91-92, and about the gun he found at the scene, TT p. 127, 
but did not provide any evidence against the Appellant. 
Officer Gary Trost testified as the first officer at the scene of the incident. He never 
saw the Appellant. TT p.97. He had nothing to offer as evidence against the Appellant. 
Karen Elliott, the fingerprint technician for the Utah Bureau of Forensic Services, 
testified only that she found no fingerprints on the suspect gun. TT pp. 138-140. 
Nicolas John Roberts ("Roberts"), the gun expert from the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Office, testified primarily to the mechanics of the gun. He was the witness whose testimony 
violated the agreement between counsel for Appellant and the State. Were his testimony 
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restricted to that agreed upon by the parties, the jury could only have considered the 
mechanical operation of the suspect pistol (1 e trigger pull, safety operation, single-action 
versus double-action, etc ) Instead, he also provided the very prejudicial information about 
the effect of the gases escaping from the chamber of the gun on firing - information the 
defense was unprepared to counter with its own expert testimony because prosecutor's 
deceit He stated "If two people were playing tug-of-war with this gun that I checked, this 
gun would still have to have its trigger pulled to have been fired And there would be burning 
of somebody Somebody would be burned " TT p 159 The implication, of course, was that 
somebody was not burned - information Roberts was not qualified to state Aside from that 
prejudicial and extremely improper testimony, nothing Roberts testified to provided evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant murdered the victim 
Dr Edward A Leis' testimony would not prove evidence of murder (as opposed to 
accident) except for the conclusory legal determination he was allowed to give the jury that 
the death was a "homicide" by "deliberate act" All of his testimony regarding the victim, 
the trajectory of the bullet, and other testimony, would have supported the defense theory of 
death by accidental shooting Even his testimony about the marks on the neck of the 
deceased is not evidence supporting murder beyond a reasonable doubt The Appellant's 
contention is further strengthened by the counter-testimony by Dr Rothfeder and the 
evidence that Jeremy Kettler's interview with Detective Kent about an alleged argument 
between the Appellant and the victim was false 
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XII. 
CONCLUSION AND SIGNATURE OF COUNSEL OF RECORD 
In light of the above arguments, Appellant seeks reversal and remand of the above-
captioned case. 
DATED this o ? day of _ 
-£*. UAjt 2003. 
"^T/^2 fit/L &&7V* 
rney for Appellant 
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XIII. 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Brief of Trent 
Tucker was either hand-delivered or mailed by United States mail, postage prepaid, this 2nd 
day of June, 2003 to the following: 
Michael D. Andruzzi, #7804 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 




Jury Instruction Ns 19 Addendum "A' 
Affidavit of Tawni Hanseen Addendum "B 




The following is a suggested tut nou required order of 
deliberation uo guide you m considering your verdict options. 
First, you should determine whether or not the evidence has 
established the crime of Murder. If you unanimously find that: 
all the elements of Murder, have been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you should not immediately convict the defendant of 
Murder. Instead, you should consider whecher the defendant also 
caused the death under the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or 
excuse. If the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant caused the death under the influence of 
extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse, then you must find that the defendant is 
guilty of Manslaughter and not of Murder. 
On the other hand, if you unanimously agree that the 
evidence has failed to establish any of the elements of Murder, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should ccnsider whecher the 
defendant is guilcy of Negligent Homicide. If you unanimously 
agree thai: the evidence establish all of the elements of 
Negligent Homicide, you must find the defendant guilcy of 
Negligent Homicide Ko^e\ras, if you unanimously agree t.iac the 
evidence has fa-lea to establish am' of the elements of 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Page 2 
Negligent Homicide, beyond a reasonable doubt, you must: find the 
defendant not guilty. 
ADDENDUM "B" 
RALPH DELLAPIANA (6861) 
TAWNI HANSEEN (#7871) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 




TRENT RAY TUCKER, : Case No. 011902328 
JUDGE SHEILA MCCLEVE 
Defendant. 
I, Tawni Hanseen, do hereby swear that the following statements are true and are made of 
my own free will and that no one has coerced me or made any promises to me in exchange for my 
statement. 
1. On or about June 6,2002,1 had a telephone conversation with Kurt Patterson, a juror 
in the above entitled action. 
2. During that conversation I asked Mr. Patterson about how the jury reached it's 
conclusion of guilt. 
2. Mr. Patterson told me that the jury did not rely on any single piece of evidence. 
3. However, he stated that the jury found it significant that there were no burns on the 
victim's hands. 
4. This was evidence that the Court specifically instructed the jury not to consider. 
DATED this 7f) day ofW/Dl _, 2002. 
U mu* 
TAWNI HANSEEN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ,- :-'5~ day of^b^O^ , 2002. 
DEBBIE GAFFNEY 
Notary Public 
State of Utah 
Mv Comm. Expires Jul 3, 
406 v 
M. 
^ r , ,-vcS -crtanUT 
.#«--— 
NOTARYPUBLIC I \) 
Residing in: 
My Commission Expires: 
ADDENDUM "C" 
AFFIDAVIT 
I, BARBARA PENMAN, of 6895 West 3830 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, swear that 
the following facts are true and correct to the best of my recollection: 
On or about February 9, 2001, I was present at 2620 South Windsor Circle, in Salt 
Lake City at the time that Phyllis Coreen Lenear died from a gunshot wound. Also present 
was Jeremy Kettler. 
Earlier that day, I saw Trent Tucker and Ms. Lenear drinking together. They 
appeared to be happy. Because Mr. Kettler told me that he saw Mr. Tucker and Ms. 
Lenear arguing earlier that day, and that he thought he saw Mr. Tucker choke Ms. Lenear, 
I asked Ms. Lenear what happened. She made it clear to me that Mr. Tucker never put his 
hands around her neck nor did he choke her. She said he did pull her hair but that she 
egged him on by calling him a pussy. Ms. Lenear had no marks on her neck. I don't think 
Trent hated her and I know he did not purposely kill her. So, Mr. Kettler was lying if he said 
anything different. 
DATED this \ V day of September, 2002. 
p>/\hkir<GL 4£?Ah\a/ 
BARBARA PENMAN ' 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake) )ss. 
thic \l On this \LP day of September, 2002, personally appeared before me BARBARA 
PENMAN, to me known to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledge to melhat she executed the sarnie. 
f
 M/,'J (LWMjfr^ 
—Notary Publ^ 
My Commis 
